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SUMMARY
In a closed-loop supply chain led by manufacturing enterprises, there are often two or more recyclers that are
very competitive among each other. The manufacturer may also provide many recycling contracts in order to identify
recyclers’ private information. This paper examines a closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer at the
core of the supply chain and two competing recyclers. In order to strike a balance between its own interest and
overall interest manufacturer provides two different recycling contracts: price contract and quantity contract. Two
situations have been analyzed in this paper: the first in which only advantage recycler adopts quantity contract and
the second in which both recyclers adopt quantity contract. A numerical simulation has been carried out according
to some current data of an enterprise. In case in which the advantage recycler adopts quantity contract and the
inferior recycler adopts price contract, the closed-loop supply chain has reached its equilibrium and the interests of
all parties have been balanced.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Thanks to its possibility to reduce resources and
pollution, a considerable attention has been paid to the
closed-loop supply chain by the government and
academia, which both attach importance to sustainable
development and low-carbon economy. The closed-
loop supply chain has already been preliminary
practiced by many enterprises. Through the closed-
loop supply chain, a lot of value contained in EOL
products can be reused in the new life cycle, which
brings about reduction in energy consumption and
environmental pollution caused by the EOL product.
Therefore, in the light of increasing contradictions
between global economic development, environmental
pressure and energy supply, the importance of a
closed-loop supply chain management seems even
more evident due to its value in promoting the a low-
carbon, environment-friendly economy. This is
particularly evident in developing countries such as
China. China’s current practice with the closed-loop
supply system is still at the initial stage and is faced
with a gap between theoretical hypotheses and
enterprise practice. This makes it difficult to give some
theoretical support to enterprises implementing the
closed-loop supply chain management system.
The instability of material supply is a major
disturbance factor in remanufacturing that is a core
link of the closed-loop supply chain value regeneration;
therefore, coordination of recycling link would be one
of the most critical bottlenecks in closed-loop supply
chain coordination between the participating parties.
In order to improve the quantity of recycling,
remanufacturer often tends to face more recyclers
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which are competitive between each other. The
recyclers’ competition rules a clear distinction to single
recovery assumes of current research. From the
perspective of the core enterprise or government the
question of how to design contract to influence and
control recycling link in order to improve the recycling
product quantity arises. This issue has become one of
the important research directions of the closed-loop
supply chain management practices.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
As one of hotly debated research theories in recent
years, the closed-loop supply chain coordination mainly
discusses how to design contract to change the
motivation of different parties in order to reduce or
avoid the loss of profits. Many types of contracts have
been used in the study, but the price contract
coordination is the most typical contract that is divided
into two subtypes: symmetric information and
asymmetric information.
Price coordination is mainly concerned with the
supply chain transfer price and revenue sharing
between upstream and downstream that is very
complex in nature. Research in this fields have been
carried out by Gu et al. [1, 2] who have studied the
pricing strategies by applying game theory; Debo [3]
has studied remanufacturing cost from a technical
and market segmentation perspective; Mukhopadhyay
and Setoputro [4, 5] have discussed the optimal price
and optimal return price problem from the perspective
of income and cost; Ge [6] had designed a revenue
sharing contract to coordinate a closed-loop supply
chain under decentralized decision; Guo et al. [7] have
studied two-order, closed-loop supply chain node
enterprise decision and have proposed cost sharing
contract for a closed-loop supply chain coordination
based on the analysis of traditional revenue sharing
contract and stochastic market demand.
Some scholars have discussed the decision making
of various participants from the perspective of closed
loop supply chain structure, such as Amaro et al. [8].
They have drawn an optimal policy under the different
parties’ cooperation relationship by mixed linear
programming method. Qiu et al. [9] have discussed
pricing decision model of two kinds of recycling
mechanisms: manufacturers recycling and retailer
recycling by coordination mechanisms of “two
charges system”, based on the assumption of market
demand stochastic. Chen and Bell [10] have studied
decentralized decision coordination of the product
buy-back closed-loop supply chain composed of a
manufacturer and a retailer. Through the un-salted
product recycling prices and customers return
product price, the system would coordinate supply
chain system and make that the manufacturers and
retailers to be win-win as well.
The above referred research is of great significance
to the advancement of the closed-loop supply chain
theory, but assumes that each link of the closed-loop
supply chain should have one participant and does not
discuss competition in case of recycling link. At the
same time, the existing theoretical research method has
been working on the design of some kind of contract
in order to eliminate or reduce the loss of supply chain
performance measured by some parameters. However,
the core enterprise often offers a variety of contracts
for recyclers to find recyclers’ own private information
in the real economy. In the case of the closed-loop
supply chain practice, recyclers’ competition has many
important features. The two previously mentioned
shortcomings are important factors that may affect the
applicability of the closed-loop supply chain theory.
Therefore, this paper in which double recycling
contract of the closed-loop supply chain based on
recyclers’ competition has been studied; aims to enrich
the theory of the closed-loop supply chain and provide
theoretical reference for enterprise practice.
3. DOUBLE RECYCLING CONTRACT
MODEL OF CLOSED-LOOP SUPPLY
CHAIN BASED ON RECYCLERS’
COMPETITION
Remanufactured products, as the closed-loop
supply chain’s final output, have different market with
respect to new products in the current socio-economic
environment; although in many papers these have been
treated as equal to new products. In this paper, it has
been assumed that the markets of new products and
remanufactured products are relatively independent,
which means that the consumers of new products
generally do not buy the remanufactured products and
the consumers of remanufactured products would not
buy a new product. So, the core enterprise of the
closed-loop supply chain does not consider the impact
of the remanufactured products on the new products
market, but only considers how the reverse supply
chain profit is maximized. Remanufactured products
with independent market are widespread in many
industries, such as: high-end household appliances,
automobiles and so on.
In this paper, the manufacturer at the same time
provides two different recycling contracts: price
contract and quantity contract to competitive recyclers.
The double recycling contract model is more
consistent with the realistic situation in the economy
and is obviously different from the assumptions in
many theory oriented studies.
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3.1. Basic assumptions
The markets of the new products and the
remanufactured products are independent of each
other, so the key issue of the closed-loop supply chain
have actually developed into reverse supply chain
coordination problems. The basic assumptions of the
model are the following:
(1) The markets of the remanufactured products
and the new products are independent of each other;
(2) In the market introduction phase, all
remanufactured products can be sold;
(3) The closed-loop supply chain is comprised of a
core remanufacturer and two competing recyclers.
When the core manufacturers make recycling price
decisions, the rule is maximization of the overall profit;
(4) The core remanufacturers providing recycling
prices is marked with the symbol prm, and the
remanufacture costs with c. Furthermore: prm+c < p0;
(5) Recycling prices of the two recyclers are pr1
and pr2. The recycling quantity of every recycler is
affected by the recycling price of both sides, and the
quantity is proportional to their own price, and is
inversely proportional to the competitor’s price. The
recycling quantity is formulated as:
QRi = r + spri − tprj (i=1,2; j = 3−i)
where s is the price-sensitive coefficient and t is the
recovery competition coefficient. Consumers are more
sensitive to retailers' price changes than rival price
changes, so: s − t > 0.
Obviously, constraint condition
rm r1 r 2p max{ p , p }>  still exists.
Under the above assumptions, the profit of closed-
loop supply chain core remanufacturer is:
p o rn R1 R2
o rn r1 r2
( p p c )( Q Q )
( p p c )[ 2r ( s t )( p p )]
π = − − + =
= − − + − + (1)
(6) In addition to price contract, recyclers can also
choose the quantity contract according to their own
situation. Manufacturing enterprises set up a minimum
recycling quantity, Qs. When the amount of a recycler’
recycling product is less than Qs, the price of each
EOL product for recyclers is rm r1 r2p max{ p , p }>
to ensure that recyclers can gain profit. When the
amount of a recycler’ recycling product is greater than
Qs, manufacturing enterprises should give subsidies R
to the recycler which is R > prm Qs and multiply it by
a coefficient to the recycling price for beyond the
quantity of Qs which is ρ and ρ > 1.
(7) In order to identify and encourage the
advantages of suppliers, manufacturing enterprise
should require that each recycler chooses his
respective contract before the start of each cycle. If a
recycler who has choosen the quantity contract cannot
complete the requirements of the contract, he should
suffer severe losses.
(8) The objective of the decision is the optimization
of the whole reverse supply chain.
The profit of the two recyclers’ is marked with π1
and π2, so the total profit of the entire reverse supply
chain is:
total p 1 2
o r1 1 r1 r2
o r2 2 r2 r1
( p p c c )( r sp tp )
 ( p p c c )( r sp tp )
π π π π= + + =
= − − − + − +
+ − − − + − (2)
3.2. Quantity contract model of
advantageous recycler with market
independent of remanufacturing product
and new product
Considering their own situation, different recyclers
may have different choices. When the quantity
contract and price contract are provided at the same
time, the model of the quantity contract coordination
has two types: advantageous recycler alone chooses
the quantity contract and both recyclers choose the
quantity contract.
When recycler R2 (advantageous recycler) alone
chooses the quantity contract, the profit of the three
parties is:
The core manufacturer:
p o rn r1 r2 o s
o rn r2 r1 s
( p p c )( r sp tp ) ( p c )Q
        R ( p p c )( r sp tp Q )
π
ρ
= − − + − + − −
− + − − + − −
Recycler R1:
1 rm r1 1 R1
rm r1 1 r1 r2
( p p c )Q
( p p c )( r sp tp )
π = − − =
= − − + −
Recycler R2:
2 rm r2 2 r2 r1 s
r2 2 s
( p p c )( r sp tp Q )
R ( p c )Q





r sp tp Q
r sp tp Q
+ − <⎧⎨ + − >⎩
* rm 1
r2 rm 2 2 2
2sr st( p c ) tr1p ( p c )
2 2( 2s t )
ρ − − += − − −
*
r1 rm 2 rm 1
2 2 2 2
tp ( p c ) ( sp sc r )
4s
1 s tr[ ]
4s 2( 2s t ) 2( 2s t )
ρ= − + − − ⋅
⋅ + −− −
Thus, the total profit of all three parties:
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2 2
total p 1 2 o s o rm s 2 rm
2 2
1 rm 2 rm o rm2 2
3 3 2 2 2 2 3 3
1 rm 2 rm 1 rm 2 rm
2 2
3
1( p c )Q {( c p p )[ 4Q s 2c s 2 p s
4s
1c st p st c t p t r( 2s t )]} {( c p p )
4( 2s t )
[ 4c s 4 p s 2c s t 2 p s t 3c st 3 p st c t p t
1r( 4s 2st t )]}
16s 8
π π π π ρ ρ
ρ
ρ ρ
= + + = − − − + − − + +
+ − + − + + − − + ⋅−
⋅ − + + − + − − + +
+ + − + −
2 2
s 2 rm 12
2 2 2 2
rm 2 rm rm 1 rm rm
2 2 3 3 2 2
2 1 rm 2 rm
2 2 3 3 2 2 2
1 rm 2 rm
2 2 2
{[ 4Q s 2c s 2 p s c st
st
p st c t p t r( 2s t )] [ 2 p s c st p st p t
r( 2s t ) c ( 2s t )]} [( 4c s 4 p s 2c s t 2 p s t
3c st 3 p st c t p t r( 4s 2st t )] /





− − + + −
− + − + + ⋅ + − − +
+ + − − + − − + −
− + + − + − − +
− + − 1 rms 2 rm 2 2
( c p )st r( 2s t )1 Q [ c p ]
2 2s t
ρ − + ++ − −
Theorem 1: When advantageous recycler chooses the quantity contract and the inferior recycler chooses the
price contract, there is an optimal value of prm to the maximum total profit of the closed-loop supply chain.
Proof:
2
2 6 2 4 2 3 3 2 2 4 5 2 6total
2
rm
4 2 6 16 2 4 2 3 3 5 4 2 6 2 4
16(1 ρ )s 4( 25 7 ρ )s t 4ρs t ( 5 16 ρ )s t 4ρst 3 t
p
( 28s t 3t 16s 16s t ) ( 4s t 2st ) ( 20s t 16s 5s t )
π ρ
ρ ρ
∂ = − + + + + − + − + =∂
= + − − + + + − −
Therefore, if we want to prove that:
2 6 2 4 2 3 3 2 2 4 5 5 2 616(1 ρ )s 4( 25 7ρ )s t 4ρs t ( 5 16 ρ )s t 2ρst 2 st 3 t 0ρ ρ− + + + + − + − − + <
we need to prove that:
4 2 6 6 2 4 2 3 3 5 4 2 6 2 4( 28s t 3t 16s 16s t ) ( 4s t 2st ) ( 20s t 16s 5s t ) 0ρ ρ+ − − + + + − − <
and because of:
4 2 6 6 2 4 6 2 2 2s s s28s t 3t 16 s 16s t t [ 2( ) 1] [ 4( ) 3] 0 ( 1 )
t t t
+ − − = − − ⋅ − < >
we obtain:
3 3 5 2 4 2 6 6 2 4 4 2 6 2 4
3 3 5 2 4 2 6 6 2 4 4 2 6 2 4
2 4 6 10 8 2 6 4 10 2 8
( 4s t 2st ) 4( 28s t 3t 16s 16s t )( 20s t 16s 5s t ) 0
( 4s t 2st ) 4( 28s t 3t 16s 16s t )( 20s t 16s 5s t )
s [ 312s t 16t 568s t 896s t 256s 136s t ] 0
+ − + − − − − <
+ − + − − − − =
= + + − − − <
Therefore, the theorem is proved.
Then we get that the optimal recycling price is:
3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3
rm
3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3
o
2 2 3 2 2 3 4 3
1 2 1 2
p { 2c( 2s 2s t st t )[ 4( 1 )s 2( 1 )s t (1 2 )st t ]
         +2 p ( 2s 2s t st t )[ 4( 1 )s 2( 1 )s t ( 1 2 )st t ]
         t( ( 2s t )( 4c s 2c s t 3c st c t ) r[ 8( 1 )s 4( 2 )s t
     
ρ ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ
= − − − + + + + − + − +
− − + + + + − + − −
− − − − − + + + + + −
2 2 3 4 4 2 2 3 4
2 2 1 2
2 6 2 4 2 3 3 2 2 4 5 2 6
    2(1 3 )s t ( 3 2 )st t ] s( 8c s 10c s t c st 3c t )]} /
        / [16( 1 )s 4( 5 7 )s t 4 s t ( 5 16 )s t 2 st 3 t ]
ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ
− + − + + + − + + −
+ − + − + + + −
Since the variables in the relationship of the closed-loop supply chain mode are very complex in a competitive
environment, a numerical analysis has been conducted in this paper. Based on the practice of a closed-loop supply
chain management of an enterprise, we assume that r=100, s=15, t=3, c1=18, c2=15, c=30, p0=98. The calculation
results show: p*rm=56.2243. The indicators of the closed-loop supply chain are shown in the Table 1.
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Double contract, including quantity contract effects
on the closed-loop supply chain, is very large and leads
to a power transfer of the whole supply chain. The core
manufacturer plays a control role in the closed-loop
supply chain and also has the largest portion of the
closed-loop supply chain profit.
(1) Because of the quantity contract, the
advantageous recycler plays to the competitive
advantage and highlights the market competition ability,
but its earnings depend on the contract return of the
core manufacturer.
(2) The difference in the recycling price between
the advantageous and disadvantageous recycler is
further widened. Using only the price contract, the
recycling price difference is lower than the cost
difference, but with the advantage recycler adopting
quantity contract, the recycling price difference is
increased to 2 times the cost difference. The recycling
quantity of the advantage recycler is raised significantly.
(3) The decline of the total recycling quantity is not
obvious. Although the quantity contract promts a
transition of power in the closed-loop supply chain,
the loss of the closed-loop supply chain efficiency
measured by recycling quantity is not obvious. In this
case, efficiency falls by only 0.84%. So, manufacturers
have good reason to encourage the advantageous
recycler to accept the quantity contract.
In order to explore the relation between competitive
retailers in a closed-loop supply chain, a mathematical
software has been used so that the influence of some
changing parameters may be analyzed. The relationship
of manufacturers' recycling price, profit and recyclers’
costs with quantity contract of recycler R2 is shown
in Figure 1.
Only the front half of the chart is effective in Figure
1. It can be seen from the Figure 1 that the recycling
price of the core enterprise is influenced by the
recyclers’ cost. The processing cost is higher and the
recycling price of the core enterprise is consequently
higher. The recycling price of a remanufacturer is so
high that it seriously reduces the enthusiasm of the core
enterprise to practise the closed-loop supply chain.
Only the front half part of Figure 2 is effective.
The relationship between the core enterprises’
recycling profit and recyclers’ competition coefficient
is not obvious. However, the relationship between the
cost of the disadvantageous recycler R1 and recycling
profit of the core enterprise is very different. The
operational efficiency of the inferior recycler has great
influence on the manufacturer’s profits, so the
manufacturer should also be paying attention to the
development of inferior recyclers, give them some
subsidies and help when they cooperate with
advantageous recyclers. Obviously, the common
development of each member of the entire ecological
chain is the key to the development of the closed-
loop supply.















Fig. 1  Relation of manufacturers' recycling price and




























Fig. 2  Relations of manufacturers' profit and recycling price
coefficient and recyclers’ cost with quantity contract
of recycler R2
Indicators Recycler R1 Recycler R2 Core manufacturer Total 
Recycling price 18.2231 24.4433 56.2243 —— 
Recycling quantity 300.017 411.98 711.997 711.997 
Recycling profit 6000.69 1425.72+R 13872-R 21298.4 
Recycling profit 
(R=8433.645) 6000.69 9859.365 5438.355 21298.4 
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3.3. Double quantity contract model with market independent of remanufacturing product and
new product
When two recyclers adopt quantity contract, the profits of both parties can be expressed as:
1 rm r1 1 r1 r 2 s r1 1 s( p p c )( r sp tp Q ) R ( p c )Qπ ρ= − − + − − + − +




r sp tp Q
r sp tp Q
+ − ≥⎧⎨ + − >⎩
The optimal recycling price of two recyclers is expressed as:
r1 rm 1 rm 2 rm 1
1 1p ( p c ) { 2r t[ p c 2 f ( r( 2s t ) ( p c )st )]}
2 2s
ρ= − − − − − + − −
r2 rm 2 rm 1
1p ( p c ) f [ 2rs t( p s sc r )]
2
ρ ρ= − − − − −
The profit of the core manufacture is:
p o s o rn r2 r1 s2( p c )Q 2R ( p p c )[ 2r ( s t )( p p ) 2Q ]π ρ= − − + − − + − + −
If used the same method as above, the total profit of a closed-loop supply chain has a maximum value. At this
point, there is:
6 6 5 5 5 5 4 2
rm o o 1 2 o o 1
4 2 4 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
o o 1 2 2 o o
2 4 2 4 5 5 6 3 2 2 3
1 o 1 2 o
3 2 2 3
p { 4 p s 4 p s 2 c s t 4c s t 4 p s t 2 p s t c s t
2 p s t 10 p s t 3 c s t 2c s t 2 c s t 2 p s t p s t
c s t 6 p s t c st c st p t c( 2s 2s t st t )
[ 2(1 )s 3 s t st t ]
ρ ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ ρ
= + + + − + + −
− − − − − + − −
− + + + − − − − + ⋅
⋅ + + − − 5 4 3 2 4
2 6 2 5 4 2 2 3 3 2 2 4 2 5 2 6
r[ 4s 2 s t ( 2 5 )s t 2 st ]} /
/[ 4(1 )s 4 s t ( 4 7 )s t 6 s t 5 s t 2 st t ]
ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ
+ − − + +
+ + − + − + + −
Using the above-mentioned data, we can calculate and obtain the closed-loop supply chain related parameters as
shown in the Table 2.
Table 2. Both recyclers taking quantity contract
Indicators Recycler R 1 Recycler R 2 
Core 
manufacturer Total 
Recycling price 17.6231 25.3202 56.6829 —— 
Recycling  quantity 288.386 426.934 715 .32 715 .32 
Recycling pro fit  R-860.263 1622 .82+R 20391.9-2R 21154.457  
Recycling pro fit  
(R=8502 .435) 7642.172 10125 .255 3387 .03 21154.457  
When both recyclers adopt quantity contract, the
effect of power transfer is more significant in the
closed-loop supply chain, but the core manufacturer’s
profit declines.
(1) When both recyclers adopt quantity contract,
the price gap between the recyclers is widened, and
the strength of the advantageous recycler is enhanced.
This istuation is a powerful tool for the core
manufacturer who then identifies the advantageous
recycler and establishes a close partnership with him.
(2) The core manufacturer’s profit and the total
profit of the closed-loop supply chain both fall to the
lowest value in the several cases. The situation is the
most favorable for the advantageous recycler which
acquires more than half the total profit of the whole
reverse supply chain. That is to say, the amount of
advantageous recycler's profit rising significantly
represents the decline in the efficiency of the whole
reverse supply chain, although the rate of decline is
not high, it is only 1.6%. Obviously, providing both
recyclers with a quantity contract is not favourable for
the core manufacturer.
(3) The recycling quantity does not change
significantly and rises slightly in comparison with the
situation in which only advantageous recycler adopts
the quantity contract. Effect of the quantity contract for
the efficiency of the closed-loop supply chain measured
by recycling quantity is very small, so the government
and the society should not have any preferences to the
adoption of the double quantity contract.
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In the case of the information symmetry, different
contract can cause a dramatic shift of power in the
closed-loop supply chain. Therefore, when a
manufacturer is the core enterprise of a closed-loop
supply chain in order to maximize their own interests
and in order not to reduce the recycling quantity too
much, the optimal choice is to make the advantageous
recycler choose a quantity contract, and
disadvantageous a price contract.
4. CONCLUSIONS
When the core manufacturer is in a leading position,
it can provide two kinds of contracts for recyclers at
the same time: price contract and quantity contract. The
matrix game of two recyclers is shown in Figure 3.
closed-loop supply chain. In addition, the government
could also contribute by giving some subsidies or
making a policy for the core manufactures who had
taken relevant countermeasures in order to promote
the development of recycling process.
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Fig. 3  Two recyclers matrix countermeasure with
manufacturers provide double contract
Obviously, choosing the quantity contract is the
best choice for both recyclers. However, in such a
situation the equilibrium of the lower right corner would
be impossible because the core enterprise cannot
disregard their own interests when the manufacturer
occupies the advantageous position in a close-loop
supple chain. The core enterprise will prompt that the
equilibrium moves to the right so that the upper right
corner becomes the most favorable and convenient to
prospective recyclers.
As the profit efficiency loss of double quantity
contracts of closed-loop supply chain, the balance of
the lower right corner cannot be realized automatically
and also is not necessary (the cost of control supply
chain including double loss of recycling profit and
quantity is too high). Obviously, the upper right corner
is the most optimal choice for manufacturing enterprise
when it has the initiative. The profit equilibrium value
of three parties’ game is:
T( M, R1, R2 ) ( 5438.355, 6000.69, 9859.365 )=JGχ
Although the manufacturer did not gain maximum
profit by holding core power, this equilibrium is the
maximum value of its profit and, at the same time,
effectively encourages the development of recycling
process of a closed-loop supply chain. That can be
regarded as a powerful measure in promotion of the
development of the closed-loop supply chain quickly
for the current situation in China where manufacturing
enterprise strength, main profit from forward supply
chain and the recycling link are the bottleneck of the
  Recycler R2 
  Price contract Quantity contract 
Price 
contract 
( 8014.66 , 9189.57 ) ( 6000.69 , 1425.72+R ) 
( 6000.69 , 9859.365 ) Recycler 
R1 Quantity 
contract 
—— ( R-860.263 , 1622.82+R ) 
( 7642.172 , 10125.255 ) 
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KOORDINACIJA ZATVORENOG OPSKRBNOG LANCA TEMELJENA NA MODELU
NADMETANJA PRU@ATELJA USLUGE RECIKLIRANJA
SA@ETAK
Zatvoreni opskrbni lanac obi~no se sastoji od proizvo|a~a kao voditelja lanca te dvaju ili više pru`atelja usluga
recikliranja me|u kojima obi~no vlada oštra konkurencija. Stoga, proizvo|a~ pru`a više ugovora za recikla`u kako
bi identificirao privatne informacije pru`atelja usluge recikliranja. U ovome se radu prou~ava zatvoreni opskrbni
lanac koji se sastoji od proizvo|a~a u središtu sustava te dvojice konkurentskih pru`atelja usluge recikliranja. Kako
bi postigao ravnote`u izme|u vlastitih i op}enitih interesa, proizvo|a~ nudi dva razli~ita ugovora za recikla`u:
ugovor o cijeni i ugovor o koli~ini. Nadalje, u ovome se radu analiziraju dvije situacije: jedna u kojoj jedino
pru`atelj usluga s konkurentskom prednoš}u potpisuje ugovor o koli~ini i druga u kojoj oba konkurenta za recikla`u
potpisuju ugovor o koli~ini. Tako|er, provedena je i numeri~ka simulacija na temelju podataka jednog aktualnog
poduzetni~kog pothvata. U slu~aju kada konkurent s prednoš}u preuzima ugovor o koli~ini, a slabiji konkurent
potpisuje ugovor o cijeni, posti`e se stanje ravnote`e ekonomskih snaga i djelovanja te su interesi svih sudionika u
procesu zadovoljeni.
Klju~ne rije~i: dvostruki ugovor za recikla`u, zatvoreni opskrbni lanac, nadmetanje pru`atelja usluga recikliranja,
ugovor o cijeni, ugovor o koli~ini.
[10] J. Chen and P.C. Bell, Coordinating a
decentralized supply chain with customer returns
and price-dependent stochastic demand using a
buyback policy, European Journal of Operational
Research, Vol. 212, pp. 293-300, 2011.
